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 The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is currently recapitalizing its aging 
fighter aircraft inventory with the F-22A and F-35.  While the DoD may consider cost and 
performance issues, it does not use a quantitative model that effectively measures the 
tradeoffs between the two.  This thesis constructs a hedonic model of the fighter aircraft 
market to measure the implicit price on fighter performance characteristics and specifically 
applies it to next-generation aircraft. 
 Data from 50 aircraft from 1949-present were used to construct two models – one 
based on procurement costs and one based on research, design, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) costs.  The models, based on a linear Box-Cox transformation, demonstrated 
that the unique F-22A trait, the ability to super-cruise, has the highest per-unit implicit 
price ($68.5M), followed by the stealth technology ($58.7M) and large-scale integrated 
circuitry ($55.3M).  The high marginal value for the super-cruise trait implies that, 
depending on how super-cruise is used operationally, the F-35A may be a more effective 
purchase in terms of resource allocation than the F-22A.
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The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) periodically recapitalizes its equipment, 
and aging aircraft are no different.  Conceptually, the aircraft modernization decision can 
be divided into two schools of thought: modernization based on financial criteria and 
modernization based on operational criteria.  Often, financial criteria (such as increasing 
life-cycle costs) drive the recapitalization of support aircraft, as several RAND studies 
indicate (Victoria A. Greenfield and David M. Persselin 2002;Edward G. Keating and 
Matthew Dixon 2003) .  Operational replacement models – typically for fighter or 
bomber aircraft – depend more on technological upgrades and increased performance 
characteristics.  However, the DoD still operates with a limited budget, and must still 
account for costs and weigh tradeoffs of these aircraft.  Currently, no framework exists 
within the DoD for evaluating cost and performance trade-offs between major weapon 
systems.  This paper proposes to create such a framework for evaluating costs and 
performance, and specifically apply it to the US fighter aircraft market. 
The current state of the US fighter aircraft market presents a unique opportunity 
to apply this model.  The US Air Force is upgrading its fleet to include a new air 
superiority fighter, the F-22A, as well as a new multi-role fighter, the F-35A.  Critics 
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have contended the F-22A is overly expensive, and some of its performance attributes 
can be found in the less expensive F-35 (Jim Winchester 2004).  No empirical models 
exists that weigh price versus capabilities, so decision makers do not have a quantitative 
framework to make the optimal modernization decision. 
One possible method to evaluate costs and performance is a hedonic price model.  
This model, formalized theoretically by Sherwin Rosen (1974), assumes different 
heterogeneous goods are composed of bundles of characteristics, and it is the supply and 
demand of these characteristics that ultimately determine the price of a good (Mark 
Dickie, Charles Delorme, and Jeffrey Humphries 1997).   These models are built with 
aggregate data for a given market.  To evaluate the cost and performance tradeoffs of the 
F-22A and F-35, two hedonic models will be constructed – one valuing the characteristics 
based on procurement costs and one based on research and development costs.  This 
technique illustrates the implicit price the United States Government places on attributes, 
thus creating a framework to assess value and capabilities.   
The fighter aircraft hedonic models include several different categories of 
variables.  Aircraft procurement costs and research, design, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) costs are used for aircraft cost data. The performance variables are divided into 
two general categories – traditional performance variables (e.g., speed) and next 
generation variables (e.g., stealth technologies).  The traditional performance variables 
include characteristics like speed and range that previous researchers such as Robert 
Morehead (1973) and Jenny Herald (2006) have included in similar models.  The next 
generation variables include characteristics such as stealth and radar advancements that 
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subject matter experts such as Thomas Hampton (1998) and Loren Thompson (2004) 
have identified as important.  
 This report is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the current literature on 
the subject, including the current decision-making framework, a discussion of hedonic 
modeling, and the rationale for selecting independent variables in the model.  Section 3 
describes the data and coding procedures.  Section 4 presents the model results, while 
Section 5 discusses implications of the results and any conclusions that can be drawn 






II. Literature Review 
 
As noted, this paper creates a hedonic framework to evaluate costs and 
performance of the US fighter aircraft market to help in procurement and modernization 
decisions.  To establish the appropriate conceptual context, the following section 
analyzes relevant literature on several issues.  First, the paper details how the Department 
of Defense currently makes modernization decisions. Then, it examines the concepts 
behind a hedonic model and how the model applies to the F-22A and F-35.  Finally, it 
discusses what characteristics will be included in this particular model. 
The Current Air Force Modernization Framework 
As suggested, decisions to update and modernize military equipment are made in 
two distinct ways: through financial criteria or mission-needs criteria.  The former is 
similar to corporate capital budgeting decisions and the latter is based on battlefield 
experience where certain technologies demonstrate some level of obsolescence in battle. 
The U.S. Air Force has sponsored a number of studies on the use of financial criteria.  In 
particular, Greenfield and Pesserlin (2002) developed a mathematical framework to 
optimize when an aircraft should be replaced based on age and increasing maintenance 
costs.  Keating and Dixon (2003) also developed a decision system to replace aircraft and 
specifically apply it to the C-21A transport and KC-135 tanker.  Both works address the 
issue from a financial perspective – they find the optimal point where the cost of 
repairing old aircraft begins to exceed the annualized cost of buying new aircraft.  
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Neither builds performance characteristics into the model.  Moreover, these financial 
models are only applied to support aircraft. 
For front-line aircraft (primarily fighters and bombers), performance becomes more of an 
issue, and the decision process becomes more complicated.  The focus shifts from when 
the most economical time to replace an aircraft is to what the performance requirements 
for a new system are once a need has been identified. Conceptually, Harold McCard 
(1991) envisions the requirements and decision process for a weapon system as a top 
down series of feedback loops beginning at the strategic level with National Security 
Policy, evaluating a number of factors such as enemy threat data and operational 
concepts, and ending at the operational level with performance requirements for new 
weapon systems (see Figure 1). William Gregory (1989) defines a more bottom up and 
direct process.  Gregory states field commanders identify a problem, the requirements to 
overcome this problem are debated between agencies such as branch headquarters and the 
intelligence community, and these requirements emerge as capabilities in new weapons.  
Both authors identify a system that is capabilities-based, not financially based.  Also, the 
decision when to modernize is based on the response to a battlefield problem, not when it 
is most economically appropriate.  The replacement decisions of the F-15 and F-16 
reflect this logic, as both will be replaced before the optimal time financially (Committee 




Figure 1. Weapon Security Requirements as a Function of National Security Policy 
 
 
Even though weapon system modernization decisions are primarily capabilities 
based, cost is still an important factor.  The DoD has a finite budget, and must face the 
same fiscal constraints as other federal organizations.  A framework that weighs both 
costs and capabilities is absent from the literature.  Anecdotal evidence suggest such a 
framework is desirable – Thomas McNaugher (1989) notes the F-15’s excessive top 
speed cost the Air Force over 1 billion dollars during its production run. A hedonic model 
incorporates both cost and capabilities and may provide a structure to evaluate price and 
performance tradeoffs. 
A Hedonic Model as a Decision Making Framework 
 Hedonic modeling gained popularity with Griliches (1961) to counter upward bias 
in price indexes due to quality changes, but Rosen (1974) laid the theoretical groundwork 
still in use today.  Rosen’s approach concerns markets with heterogeneous goods – goods 
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that can be divided into utility-bearing characteristics.  From this perspective, the good is 
essentially a bundle of attributes, and the price reflects the supply and demand of the 
underlying characteristics.  Regressing these characteristics against the good’s price can 
reveal the marginal value the consumer places on each attribute.  Rosen also states that 
demand functions for each attribute are attainable.  Deriving these demand functions has 
proved highly problematic and is ultimately beyond the scope of this work (Patrick Bajari 
and C. Lanier Benkard 2005).  Instead, I focus on the marginal value the DoD places on 
fighter aircraft attributes. 
 In formalizing the hedonic method, Rosen made a number of assumptions, two of 
which will have to be relaxed to apply the method to fighter aircraft.  First, Rosen 
specified a market should have an extremely large multitude of goods, creating a 
continuum of products.  In practice, this assumption is usually eased .  Many of the 
markets where a hedonic model is applied only have a few hundred products at the most, 
and most markets have far less (N. M. Arguea, C. Hsiao, and G.A. Taylor 1994; William 
Boulding and Devavrat Purohit 1996; Joanna Stavins 1997).  The fighter aircraft market 
only has a few different airframes operating at any one time, so the product spectrum is 
limited.  Second, Rosen applies his theory to a market in perfect competition.  Like the 
first assumption, this assumption is usually relaxed in application.  Often the hedonic 
method is applied to monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic markets (David 
Prentice and Xiangkang Yin 2004).  The fighter aircraft market is far removed from 
perfect competition, as it has a few suppliers and typically only one consumer. 
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 Hedonic models have been applied in numerous situations, from testing markets 
for monopoly power to valuing the safety features in automobiles (William Boulding and 
Devavrat Purohit 1996; Frank Verboven 2002).  It has not been used as a decision-
making framework, but because notionally the government is paying for a bundle of 
performance characteristics in each fighter aircraft, a hedonic model can determine the 
marginal value the government places on each characteristic.  Military planners can then 
decide if the implicit value is worth the cost, weighing both value and performance.  The 
caveat to a hedonic model as a decision-making tool is that it does not focus on when to 
modernize, and the government must have a firm understanding of the costs and 
capabilities of the products it is evaluating.   
Model Variable Selection 
Many of the attributes used in the hedonic models are those identified as 
important by either previous research or subject matter experts.  In particular, many 
characteristics from legacy aircraft are derived from past studies.  Characteristics used in 
the model from next-generation aircraft are those identified as important by experts, as 
little quantitative research has been conducted on these systems.   
 Traditional fighter performance variables include those variables 
previously identified as significant in legacy aircraft.  This study will use maximum 
speed, service ceiling, combat radius, weight, and relative measures of the sophistication 
of electronic components.  Herald (2006) explained 91% of the variation in fighter 
aircraft prices from 1945-1986 with many of these variables (she did not use weight, and 
used total range instead of combat radius).  Maximum speed and service ceiling describe 
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how fast and how high the aircraft can fly.  Combat radius accounts for the combat area 
of operations.  Herald’s study used total flying range with refueling tanks instead of 
combat radius, but the addition of fuel tanks affects the stealth ability of next generation 
fighters.   
 Many authors have outlined the critical capabilities that the next generation of 
fighters will bring to the DoD.  Both Thomas Hampton (1998) and Michael Costigan  
(1997) identified the F-22A’s stealth and super-cruise abilities as important to the next 
generation of warfare.  Super-cruise denotes an aircraft’s ability to sustain speeds in 
excess of Mach 1 without the use of afterburner.  Devin Cate (2003) indicates the next 
generation of fighters will have an Active Electronically Scanned Array radar, which will 
allow for greater radar range, lower probability of interception, and the ability to track 
multiple targets at once.  Finally, the DoD is in the process of acquiring the F-35B, a 
plane that can perform vertical take-off and landing (STVOL) maneuvers (Christopher 
Bolkcom 2004).  Therefore, this variable will be incorporated as well. 
 This study uses one additional variable not used in other studies.  The F-35, 
designed subsequent to F-22A research, directly benefited from research and 
development performed on the F-22A.  One additional variable is added to attempt to 
control for this effect.  
Functional Form   
There is no definitive guidance on the appropriate functional form for hedonic 
models.  As such, a number of forms have been used in past research.  Maureen Cropper, 
Leland Deck, and Kenneth McConnell (1988) explored six different forms: the linear, 
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semi-log, log-log, quadratic, linear Box-Cox transformation, and the quadratic Box-Cox 
transformation.  Cropper, Deck, and McConnell simulated housing market equilibria with 
data from the Baltimore area.  By comparing consumers’ actual marginal bids for each 
characteristic with those determined by the models, they found that while complex 
quadratic models perform well when every attribute is observable, the simpler forms 
greatly outperform the others when either attributes are missing or are replaced by proxy 
variables.  The linear Box-Cox transformation performed well in cases where all 
attributes are observed and in cases where some attributes are not represented.  Thus, 
their recommendation is to use the linear Box-Cox transformation when estimating the 
marginal value of characteristics.  In line with this recommendation, this study will use 
the linear Box-Cox functional form to estimate values.  Appendix A and B give a more 
in-depth analysis of comparisons among the simpler functional forms (linear, semi-log, 
log-log, and linear Box-Cox). 
 Literature Review Summary 
 McCard (1991) and Gregory (1989) have theorized on how the modernization 
decision occurs for the Department of Defense, but there has been little quantitative work 
on these decisions for fighter aircraft.  In particular, no previous work exists on price and 
performance tradeoffs.   A hedonic price model, as described by Rosen (1974), weighs 
both costs and capabilities and may provide a proper decision-making framework.  This 
model will demonstrate the marginal values the Department of Defense places on aircraft 
attributes.  In this model, the independent variables range from traditional performance 
characteristics such as maximum speed to next-generation characteristics such as super-
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cruise.  Since economic theory cannot provide guidance on the functional form of the 
model, the linear Box-Cox form is used, following the recommendation of Cropper, 
Deck, and McConnell (1988).  By calculating the implicit prices of attributes with this 




III. Data and Methods 
The primary goal of this research project is to create an empirical model that 
evaluates the price and performance characteristics of fighter aircraft.  This chapter 
outlines this procedure, first by describing data used in the model, then by detailing 
coding techniques used in this study. 
Data 
This study builds two models – one aimed to determine the attribute values for 
procurement costs, and one for research, design, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs.  A 
separate model for each phase of aircraft acquisition allows for comparisons across 
phases.  We may gain certain insights into price and performance if these two models 
vary greatly.  Also, two models allow for the inclusion of different variables for each 
stage. 
All aircraft data comes from three sources: Ted Nicholas’ and Rita Rossi’s U.S. 
Military Aircraft Data Book series, Paul Jackson’s, Kenneth Munson’s, and Lindsay 
Peacock’s Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft series, and Marcelle Knaack’s Encyclopedia of 
US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems, Volume I.  The data to construct the hedonic 
model are from the domestic US fighter market, and does not consider foreign aircraft, 
nor does it consider domestic aircraft that will only be sold to foreign nations (i.e. the F-
16C Block 60).  The data set includes characteristics from 50 aircraft, ranging in age 
from the 1949 F-84E Thunderjet to the currently-in-development F-35 series of fighters.  
In some cases, fighter characteristics from two sources conflict – for example, the two 
sources may list different top speeds for the same aircraft.  In these instances, the 
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characteristic in question is averaged.  While this technique may not be ideal in finding 
the true value of the attribute, it hedges against listing a value that is either too high or too 
low. 
For the purposes of this study, procurement cost is defined as weapon system cost 
– the physical system itself – plus any extra costs for initial spares and parts.  In several 
aircraft, procurement costs could not be obtained and flyaway cost is used instead.  In 
aircraft where both flyaway cost and procurement cost are available, the flyaway cost is 
usually lower by 2-3% (Nicholas and Rossi, 1991).  The RDT&E costs include all costs 
for the research and development of the aircraft, and do not overlap with procurement 
costs. Any RDT&E costs for later modifications to the aircraft are also included. 
Together these two cost brackets can be thought of as total system cost.  All costs are 
average unit costs over the life of the system except for the F-35, in which case predicted 
costs are used.  All aircraft costs are base year 2005 dollars. 
Variable Coding 
The independent variables include both continuous and categorical variables.  The 
continuous variables include maximum take-off weight (measured in lbs), combat radius 
(miles), maximum speed (mph at 30,000 ft), and service ceiling (ft).   The variables for 
the integrated circuitry, large-scale integrated circuitry, AESA radar, STVOL, stealth 
technologies, super-cruise, and F-35 research benefits are binary categorical variables.  
As Table 1 illustrates, both maximum take-off weight and average combat radius possess 
a high variance relative to their mean.  Maximum speed and service ceiling are much less 
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disperse.  To form the RDT&E model, all variables are used.  For the procurement 
model, all variables with the exception of F-35 RDTE DUMMY are incorporated. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics – Independent Variables  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Max TO Weight (lbs) 45463.06 20367.81 15710 85406
Max Speed (mph) 1102.85 323.81 517.5 1650
Combat Radius (mi) 674.66 300.09 180.55 1239
Ceiling (ft) 50726.00 4929.28 33000 65000
Int Circuitry 0.16 0.37 0 1
LS Int Circuitry 0.34 0.48 0 1
AESA Radar 0.12 0.33 0 1
STVOL 0.04 0.20 0 1
Stealth 0.10 0.30 0 1
Supercruise 0.02 0.14 0 1
F-35 RDTE Dummy 0.06 0.24 0 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
 
Several variables deserve special mention.  In particular, STEALTH, SUPERCRUISE, 
and F-35 RDTE DUMMY all have nuances that may aide in the interpretation of any 
results.  Almost all aircraft denoted by STEALTH also posses the next generation of 
aircraft computer technology, the integrated avionics suite. While STEALTH primarily 
identifies aircraft as possessing radar-absorbent technologies, as a rough proxy it 
additionally includes value associated with the integrated avionics suite due to 
collinearity between the two characteristics (see Appendix C).  SUPERCRUISE is 
intended to capture the ability to cruise above Mach 1 without afterburners, but the F-
22A is the only plane with this technology.  Thus, SUPERCRUISE acts as an F-22A 
dummy variable and, from a modeling standpoint, it captures anything possessed by only 
the F-22A.  However, research failed to identify anything unique to the F-22A beyond 
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super-cruise ability.  The variable F-35 RDTE DUMMY, only present in the RDT&E 
model, acts in much the same way SUPERCRUISE acts.  It captures anything unique to 
F-35 RDT&E spending.  For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that this is the 
benefit gained from past F-22A research. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
The following section provides the results of the two hedonic models based on the 
linear Box-Cox transformation.  First, the untransformed models are provided with an 
initial assessment of model performance.  Then, the marginal values based on model 
coefficients are presented for further analysis.  All marginal values are based on mean 
procurement and RDT&E costs and mean performance characteristics. 
Model Results 
 The Box-Cox-transformed procurement model explains approximately 88.5% of 
the variation in procurement costs, with a number of variables significant at α = .1.  
STVOL fell just outside the this significance level (p >.118).  Among the non-
transformed categorical variables, both LS INT CIRCUITRY and SUPERCRUISE have 
the largest magnitude, with every categorical variable demonstrating some degree of 
significance.  At this level of analysis, care must be exercised in interpreting the 
magnitude of the continuous variables due to the effect of the transformation.  The sign of 
every significant variable met a priori expectations. 
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Table 2.  Model Estimate: Procurement 
Variable Chi-sq 
Max TO Weight 59490.03 *** 17.50
Max Speed 1035.52 ** 5.61
Combat Radius -29.61 0.09
Ceiling -2804.55 0.32
Int Circuitry 0.47 ** 3.93
LS Int Circuitry 1.43 *** 30.29
AESA Radar 0.63 ** 3.84
STVOL 0.59 2.44
Stealth 1.15 *** 10.05







*** .01 Level of Significance
** .05 Level of Significance




The RDT&E model enjoyed similar results – the model captured 85.9% of 
research and development cost variance, with almost every variable statistically 
significant.  Of the categorical variables, SUPERCRUISE (4.72) had the largest 
coefficient, closely followed by STEALTH (4.23).  F-35 RDTE DUMMY met a priori 
expectations with respect to sign, with a statistically significant negative coefficient (-






Table 3. Model Estimate: RDT&E 
 
Variable Chi-sq 
Max TO Weight 1.90E-41 *** 9.11
Max Speed -6.40E-27 *** 9.14
Combat Radius 5.50E-26 * 3.56
Ceiling 7.12E-41 0.26
Int Circuitry 0.45 *** 7.77
LS Int Circuitry 2.66 *** 18.80
AESA Radar 2.49 *** 8.09
STVOL 0.38 *** 7.77
Stealth 4.23 *** 11.50
Supercruise 4.72 *** 9.37







*** .01 Level of Significance
** .05 Level of Significance





Model coefficients alone do not lend themselves well to in-depth analysis.  This 
requires calculation of the implicit marginal value of each attribute (see Appendix D for 
implicit price equations).  This section reveals the value of each characteristic based on 
the linear Box-Cox model.  All marginal values are in millions of dollars. 
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 The marginal values for the procurement model cover a wide range, and while 
some initially appear trivial, all may have a significant impact.  The incremental value for 
MAX TO WEIGHT is approximately $500.  However, this is on a per-pound basis, so a 
1000 lb weight increase results in a $500,000 increase in price per aircraft.  Likewise, 
each mile/hour increase raises the value of the aircraft by $20,000.  The largest changes 
in value are attributed to LS INT CIRCUITRY and SUPERCRUISE, with respective 
increases of $37.4M and $36.8M.  STEALTH raises the value another $30M, and the 
other categorical variables increase value to a lesser degree. 
 
Table 4. Marginal Values: Procurement 
Variable Marginal Value
Max TO Weight 0.0005 ***
Max Speed 0.02 **
Combat Radius -0.001
Ceiling -0.00002
Int Circuitry 12.29 **
LS Int Circuitry 37.42 ***




*** .01 Level of Significance
** .05 Level of Significance
* .1   Level of Significance
PROCUREMENT MODEL MARGINAL VALUES
 
 
The RDT&E cost model marginal values differ slightly from their procurement 
model counterparts.  The single largest value driver is the inclusion of SUPERCRUISE 
($31.8M), with STEALTH ($28.5M) second.  LS INT CIRCUITRY and AESA RADAR 
capability also demonstrate large value increases, as the inclusion of these abilities lead to 
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changes of $17.9 and $16.8M, respectively. According to this model, the F-35 inherits 
$22M in RDT&E value from the F-22A.  Contrary to a priori expectations, maximum 
speed appears to be a disamenity, as every mph increase leads to a $4,000 decrease in 
RDT&E value.  
Table 5. Marginal Values: RDT&E 
 
Variable Marginal Value
Max TO Weight 0.00002 ***
Max Speed -0.004 ***
Combat Radius 0.001 *
Ceiling 0.0001
Int Circuitry 3.03 ***
LS Int Circuitry 17.93 ***




F-35 RDTE Dummy -22.05 ***
*** .01 Level of Significance
** .05 Level of Significance
* .1   Level of Significance
RDT&E MODEL MARGINAL VALUES
  
 
These models demonstrate the relative value the DoD is placing on aircraft 
attributes by agreeing to certain costs.  In both models, SUPERCRUISE acts as a large 
value driver, with STEALTH and circuitry components following to lesser degrees.  The 
combined models paint the picture that SUPERCRUISE and electronics are the most 




V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The two hedonic models presented may have certain implications with regard to 
the purchase of next-generation fighter aircraft.  However, this study has certain 
limitations.  In the remaining section, these limitations are discussed, as well as 
conclusions drawn from the results. 
Caveats and Limitations 
These models represent one of the few hedonic analyses performed on the 
Department of Defense aircraft market, and like others, they are subject to several 
limitations. These caveats include an atypical market setting and the inclusion of 
categorical and proxy variables that attempt to capture aircraft characteristics.  To fully 
understand the meaning of the marginal values, any potential shortfalls must be 
understood. 
  Much economic theory rests on the assumption that the market in question has an 
abundance of buyers and sellers, or at the very least, many buyers and several 
competitive sellers.  Hedonic theory is no different.  However, the DoD domestic aircraft 
market has only one buyer and a few (sometimes only one) sellers.  This monopsonist vs. 
oligopolist setting is not prevalent in economic literature, so the ramifications of this 
relationship and its impact on hedonic modeling are not fully understood.  One issue that 
has developed from this situation is the use of cost data to approximate price.  Many 
major weapon systems are now bought on cost-based contracts, where the government 
reimburses the contractor for all costs incurred.  This procurement method differs from a 
more typical market, where prices adjust to an equilibrium through the interaction of 
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buyers and sellers.  However, one may argue that cost contracts are rarely as simple as 
contractors reporting cost numbers and getting reimbursed, and in fact, a lot of 
negotiation occurs over what the true “costs” are.  From this perspective, the negotiated 
cost could be viewed as an equilibrium price point.  No matter the point of view, this 
economic situation remains unexplored and its impact unknown. 
 In the same way the cost data of the dependent variable is a proxy for price, a 
number of independent variables are modeled by categorical and proxy variables.  
Ideally, there are more finely tuned parameters to model these characteristics.  For 
instance, the model currently uses a categorical variable to denote stealth ability.  A more 
appropriate measure may be the actual radar cross-section of the aircraft.  Similarly, 
highest attainable speed without the use of afterburners may more adequately model 
super-cruise ability, and some measure of processing power may more precisely model 
the circuitry variables.  Unfortunately, aircraft radar cross-section data are classified, the 
highest attainable speed without afterburners is not reported, and no single yardstick 
exists that measures the spectrum of plane electronics.  All variables were modeled as 
such due to lack of data. 
 The cost data used in this report for the F-35 deserves special mention.  As the 
plane is still in development, the most recent reported estimates for the final cost were 
used.  If the aircraft follows the trend of its predecessors, costs will increase before it 
enters steady-state production.  The DoD is purchasing the plane under the Cost as an 
Independent Variable acquisition strategy, and ideally this should limit cost growth.  
However, some degree of cost growth is likely.   
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Discussion of Results 
 In light of these limitations, the results merit some discussion.  More precisely, 
the statistical significance of model variables allows us to determine what is important to 
the DoD, while marginal values derived from the models allow side-by-side comparisons 
of aircraft.  
 The two models demonstrate relative similarities in what is statistically 
significant.  Considering the variable STVOL in the procurement model is weakly 
significant (p > .118), the only variable to demonstrate a strong difference in significance 
is COMBAT RADIUS.  The RDT&E model shows this attribute to be significant, while 
the procurement model does not.  This indicates the aircraft’s combat radius is minimally 
valuable ($1,000 per additional mile) during initial development, and subsequently 
becomes less valuable during actual procurement.  This finding casts doubt on the 
arguments of Costigan (1997) that aircraft with extended combat radii such as the F-22A 
are inherently more valuable to the DoD.  It is not that range is unimportant, but rather 
not strongly valued. 
 The marginal values derived from the models allow for certain comparisons 
between aircraft.  Of particular interest to this paper are the conclusions that can be drawn 
between the next-generation fighter aircraft (see Table 6).  The F-22A and F-35A share 
many similar traits of the variables found statistically significant.  They weigh 
approximately the same, share similar radar types and circuitry, and possess some level 
of stealth capability.  The difference in procurement value stems from the F-22A’s 
marginally faster top speed and ability to super-cruise.  Of the $38.3M in increased value 
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the procurement model identifies, super-cruise composes $36.8M.  The RDT&E model 
shows a different pattern – while SUPERCRUISE is valuable ($31.8M), the $22M 
inherited by the F-35 drives the value increase down to approximately $10M. 
 Inter-generational comparisons can be made as well; however, the interpretation 
of these comparisons must be kept in the appropriate context.  Technical aspects of 
aircraft change over time, so implicit value comparisons are time-sensitive.  For instance, 
the DoD values the F-22A $28M more today than it valued the F-15E in its procurement 
period (1986-2001).  Similar comparisons show the DoD values the next generation of 
multi-role fighter, the F-35, $10.6M more than the F-16C during its buying cycle.  The 
RDT&E model demonstrates the value the DoD places on super-cruise and stealth, as the 
F-22A shows a $60.9M increase over the F-15E. 
Table 6. Select Marginal Price Comparisons 
COMPARISON OF IMPLICIT VALUES BETWEEN SELECT AIRCRAFT ($M)
Aircraft Increase
F-22A over F-35A 38.32
F-22A over F-15E 27.98
F-35A over F-16C 10.58
F-15E over F-16C 20.41
Aircraft Increase
F-22A over F-35A 9.97
F-22A over F-15E 60.93
F-35A over F-16C 6.13




The real-life difference in procurement cost of the F-22A and F-35A is 
approximately $123M.  The difference between the actual cost difference and the implicit 
cost difference stems from the inability to “untie” the bundled good in question and move 
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an attribute to another good without any reassembly costs.  However, this is not the case 
with most goods, including aircraft.  This discrepancy can then be thought of as extra 
transaction and reassembly costs associated with non-divisible products (Rosen 1974). 
Study Implications 
  While this study does not attempt to resolve any conflicts over the next-generation 
aircraft, certain insights can be drawn from the hedonic models.  Specifically, these 
models imply increasing costs have very definite value trade-offs, that trivial differences 
in many attributes do mean trivial differences in value, and that the DoD’s current 
acquisition strategy with next generation fighter aircraft may be inefficient from a “best-
value” perspective. 
The original plans for the F-22A did not include such a high price-tag.  Due to 
both requirements increases and cost over-runs, F-22A procurement costs grew 55% from 
1991 to 2005, while total system costs grew 129% (David Walker 2006).  Increasing 
costs can have implicit-value consequences, especially on those characteristics unique to 
the aircraft in question.  For instance, the ability to super-cruise is unique to the F-22A.  
If the procurement cost of the F-22A was closer to $109M (the 1991 projected price) 
instead of $170M, then super-cruise loses some of its statistical significance (p>.137 
instead of p>.018).  Additionally, the marginal value of super-cruise diminishes ($20.7M 
instead of $36.8M).  This is a rough estimation, as it does not account for any changes in 
other performance characteristics over the time period, but it demonstrates the effect 
increasing costs have on value.  Any system with large cost increases (all else held 
constant), will see a sharp rise in implicit prices on system-unique traits. 
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In comparing attributes that the F-22A and F-35A share, it becomes apparent the 
two aircraft are remarkably similar.  Of the statistically significant variables, the only 
variables demonstrating any change are maximum speed and combat radius.  Other 
characteristics, such as stealth and radar types, are largely the same.  The difference in 
speed accounts for a $1.4M value increase in procurement dollars and the difference in 
combat radius creates a $1.0M increase in RDT&E dollars.  These small changes in 
aircraft performance characteristics lead to small changes in value.  This fact is due in 
part to the size of the changes and the attributes’ relatively small implicit values.  To see 
a large increase in value of one aircraft over the other, large changes in attributes would 
be needed, and that is not the case when comparing the next generation fighters. 
If a goal of the DoD acquisition system is efficiency in spending, this study 
indicates current next-generation fighter acquisition may not be efficient in dollar/ 
performance trade-offs.  By agreeing to certain costs, the DoD has implicitly placed 
certain values on characteristics.  In comparing the difference in total system 
(procurement and RDT&E) values of next-generation fighter aircraft, the DoD places a 
$48.3M value premium on the F-22A – less than the $60.5M total system cost of the F-
35, but slightly more than the $47M procurement cost.  This difference is primarily due 
to one attribute, super-cruise, coupled with the high price of an F-22A.  As mentioned 
previously, the value placed on super-cruise is $36.8M in procurement dollars and 
$31.8M in RDT&E dollars.  If the DoD truly feels that super-cruise is worth at least 
$68.6M per plane, then the DOD is being efficient in spending.  However, that may be a 
tough sell in our current fiscal environment since the F-35A’s procurement cost ($47M) 
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is only $10M more than the procurement value of super-cruise alone.  Other than super-
cruise, the differences between the aircraft are trivial.  This leads to an interesting 
hypothetical scenario for the DoD:  What is worth more, the ability to super-cruise in an 
F-22A plus $10M or a whole F-35 aircraft?  According to this model, at the current 
aircraft costs they are about equal.  Depending on how super-cruise is used operationally, 
some may feel the DoD is paying a high premium for the F-22A. 
Future Study Recommendations 
 While this study attempts to identify certain value and performance tradeoffs, it 
may benefit from other research on unexplored areas of the economics pertaining to the 
Department of Defense.  In particular, more research should be conducted investigating 
the cost/price relationship, the cost over-run value linkage, and the inclusion of more data 
to fine-tune this relationship. 
 Much of the theoretical economic groundwork employed in this research effort 
(and others) assumes the existence of markets where the buyers and sellers act in a 
particular way.  However, the DoD does not operate in a typical market and cost data is 
used to approximate price.  Many studies would benefit from a closer examination of this 
market, an examination of the cost/price relationship, and any theoretical and practical 
implications of using cost data. 
This study implies increasing costs affect value.  The DoD and others may profit 
from more in-depth studies linking cost over-runs with value consequences or over-runs 
with a dollar-per-utility measure.  This avenue of research may help identify current 
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inefficiencies in spending or cost-growth patterns where spending efficiency drops 
greatly. 
A natural extension of this study could take into account more variables or cost 
relationships.  This study used average procurement and RDT&E costs over the life-cycle 
of the aircraft.  Other areas of research could examine the effect learning curves have on 
marginal values or they could incorporate complete life-cycle costs, to include 
maintenance and logistics.  Part of the value of certain aircraft may be hidden in lower 
maintenance costs. 
Perhaps another research project could examine a more fundamental question:  
How do two similar systems (in terms of performance attributes), such as the F-22A and 
F-35A, have such different costs?  This fact also brings into question the operational 
nature of the aircraft.  The F-22A was initially designed as an air-superiority fighter and 
later converted to accept more roles.  The F-35A was designed from the ground up as a 
multi-role fighter.  An operational study may examine if the (mostly small) differences in 
the aircraft have a large operational effectiveness.  These findings may later be linked to 
differences in cost. 
Final Remarks 
This study originally set out to build a hedonic model of the US fighter aircraft 
market and apply its findings to the acquisition of next-generation fighter aircraft.  With a 
few caveats, it reveals the implicit price placed on the F-22A’s ability to sustain speeds in 
excess of Mach 1 to be in excess of $60M (total system cost) per aircraft.  The DoD is 
now in a position to evaluate both price and performance.  If the DoD feels the benefit 
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gained from the difference in performance characteristics the F-22A possesses over other 
aircraft is worth at least its implicit cost, then F-22A acquisition should continue as is.  
However, if benefits gained from the F-22A (and in particular super-cruise) are trivial, 
then the DoD should modify its acquisition plan accordingly. 
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Appendix A. Comparison of Functional Forms 
 
Cropper, Deck, and McConnell (1988) found the more mathematically simple 
models – the Box-Cox, linear, semi-log, and log-log, outperform the more complex 
models in situations where attributes are omitted or proxy variables are used.  The Box-
Cox transformation was their functional form of choice, but the others are not without 
merit.   
In comparing functional forms on procurement costs, all models explained at least 
80% of the variation in costs, with the highest R2 belonging to the Box-Cox 
transformation (adj R2 = .885).  The Box-Cox model also enjoyed more significant 
variables than the other forms.  Both the semi-log and log-log forms were plagued with 
heteroskedasticity (according to the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test). 
The RDT&E models demonstrated a higher range of explained variation of the 
dependent variable, with the linear form possessing the highest R2 (.926).  The RDT&E 
models show a striking difference across forms when comparing significant variables.  
Almost all the variables of the Box-Cox model were significant at the 1% level, while 
other models demonstrated only one or two significant variables. 
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Variable Chi-sq t t t
Max TO Weight 59490.03 *** 17.50 0.0005 *** 2.77 0.0000175 ** 2.49 0.89 *** 3.34
Max Speed 1035.52 ** 0.09 -0.005 -0.44 0.001 1.5 -0.01 -0.05
Combat Radius -29.61 5.61 0.01 1.3 -5.75E-06 -0.01 0.87 1.22
Ceiling -2804.55 0.32 -0.0004 -1.2 -0.00001 -0.36 -0.17 -0.11
Int Circuitry 0.47 ** 3.93 12.99 * 1.79 0.57 1.53 0.45 1.2
LS Int Circuitry 1.43 *** 30.29 28.17 *** 4.19 1.15 *** 2.92 1.11 *** 2.9
AESA Radar 0.63 ** 3.84 26.58 *** 2.85 0.61 1.59 0.50 1.27
STVOL 0.59 2.44 4.32 0.37 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.62
Stealth 1.15 *** 10.05 16.31 1.5 1.03 1.55 1.00 1.37
Supercruise 1.41 ** 5.63 103.12 *** 6.03 1.12 1 1.10 ** 2.19
Cons -55128.13 -- 4.78 0.31 0.75 0.67 -11.48 -0.78
R-sq 0.908 0.862 0.860 0.883
Adj R-sq 0.885 0.826 0.825 0.853
Variable Coeff. Chi-sq Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Max TO Weight 1.90E-41 *** 9.11 0.0002 1.15 0.00002 1.19 0.83 1.39
Max Speed -6.40E-27 *** 9.14 -0.01 -0.85 -0.0003 -0.19 -0.51 -0.47
Combat Radius 5.50E-26 * 3.56 0.006 0.53 -0.0005 -0.55 -0.44 -1.07
Ceiling 7.12E-41 0.26 0.0003 0.53 0.0000001 0 -0.51 -1.17
Int Circuitry 0.45 *** 7.77 3.19 0.54 -0.11 -0.2 0.03 0.06
LS Int Circuitry 2.66 *** 18.80 9.10 1.56 2.11 *** 3.98 2.48 *** 4.71
AESA Radar 2.49 *** 8.09 13.18 * 2.04 0.90 1.32 0.80 1.24
STVOL 0.38 *** 7.77 -1.80 -0.34 0.11 0.14 -0.07 -0.09
Stealth 4.23 *** 11.50 30.53 0.84 1.33 1.04 0.77 0.61
Supercruise 4.72 *** 9.37 121.19 ** 2.29 2.63 1.45 3.52 * 1.92
F-35 RDTE Dummy -3.27 *** 9.27 -35.29 -0.91 -0.16 -0.1 0.72 0.41
Cons 0.15 -- -9.16 -0.48 0.03 0.01 3.15 0.38
R-sq 0.902 0.949 0.806 0.818
Adj R-sq 0.859 0.926 0.720 0.737
*** .01 Level of Significance Ŧ Heterskedastistic; robust standard errors used
** .05 Level of Significance
* .1   Level of Significance
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Appendix B.  Marginal Values Between Functional Forms 
 
Marginal values between models identified as most appropriate by Cropper, Deck, 
and McConnell (1988) show a relative amount of stability in the procurement models, 
and a higher degree of variation in the RDT&E models.  Three procurement models – the 
Box-Cox, the semi-log, and the log-log – identify marginal values that are in close 
agreement, with the linear model only in agreement on a few variables.  This is most 
evident with the “super-cruise” variable, where the linear form shows a $103M marginal 
value and the other three are closely clustered in the mid $30M range.  The RDT&E 
models show no discernable pattern among marginal prices.  This lack of consistency 




Max TO Weight 0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0006 ***
Max Speed 0.02 ** -0.0047 0.03 -0.0003
Combat Radius -0.0013 0.01 -0.0002 0.04
Ceiling -0.00002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001
Int Circuitry 12.29 ** 12.99 * 17.92 14.22
LS Int Circuitry 37.42 *** 28.17 *** 36.23 *** 35.07 ***
AESA Radar 16.58 ** 26.58 *** 19.33 15.71
STVOL 15.54 4.32 21.51 20.62
Stealth 30.18 *** 16.31 32.64 31.49
Supercruise 36.75 ** 103.12 *** 35.35 34.76 **
Variable
Max TO Weight 0.00002 *** 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
Max Speed -0.004 *** -0.01 -0.0038 -0.01
Combat Radius 0.001 * 0.01 -0.01 -0.0097
Ceiling 0.0001 0.0003 0.000002 -0.0002
Int Circuitry 3.03 *** 3.19 -1.63 0.51
LS Int Circuitry 17.93 *** 9.10 31.55 *** 37.04 ***
AESA Radar 16.78 *** 13.18 * 13.39 12.01
STVOL 2.57 *** -1.80 1.62 -1.04
Stealth 28.51 *** 30.53 19.81 11.44
Supercruise 31.78 *** 121.19 ** 39.23 52.56 *
F-35 RDTE Dummy -22.05 *** -35.29 -2.38 10.71
*** .01 Level of Significance
** .05 Level of Significance Ŧ Heterskedastistic; robust standard errors used
* .1   Level of Significance
COMPARISON OF MARGINAL VALUES BETWEEN FUNCTIONAL FORMS
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Appendix C. Correlation Between Variables 
 
Below is the correlation matrix for all independent variables used in this study, 
plus two more that were originally included.  INT AV SUITE (Integrated Avionics Suite) 
represents the progression of the circuitry variables in the next generation fighter aircraft.  
However, this variable is highly collinear with STEALTH (r = .88).  Thus, from a 
modeling standpoint, these variables capture the same information.  YEAR, denoting the 
year the first operational aircraft was delivered to the DoD, was included to capture the 
increase in price not explained by independent variables (Manuchehr Irandoust 1998) .  It 
was dropped due to the correlation between itself, STEALTH, and AESA RADAR.  F-35 
RDTE DUMMY, while demonstrating a degree of collinearity with both AESA RADAR 
and STEALTH, was ultimately left in the model due to the large preponderance of 
evidence suggesting the F-35 directly benefited from the RDT&E of the F-22A.  
Max TO Weight Combat Radius Max Speed Ceiling Int Circuitry LS Int Circuitry Int Av Suite AESA Radar STVOL Stealth Supercruise Year F-35 RDTE Dummy
Max TO Weight 1
Combat Radius 0.42 1
Max Speed 0.63 0.05 1
Ceiling 0.33 0.26 0.37 1
Int Circuitry -0.03 -0.35 0.36 0.14 1
LS Int Circuitry 0.58 0.52 0.35 0.26 -0.31 1
Int Av Suite 0.21 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.13 -0.21 1
AESA Radar 0.30 0.18 0.01 -0.03 -0.16 -0.01 0.80 1
STVOL 0.00 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.32 0.24 1
Stealth 0.21 0.07 -0.13 -0.18 -0.15 -0.10 0.88 0.70 0.27 1
Supercruise 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 0.48 0.39 -0.03 0.43 1
Year 0.56 0.32 0.29 0.12 -0.18 0.48 0.67 0.77 0.32 0.65 0.28 1
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Appendix E. Sample Data Set 
 
Airframe Proc Cost RDTE Cost Max TO Weight Combat Radius Max Speed Ceiling
F-35B 65.22 13.41 60000 679 1056 48000
F-35A 47.82 13.41 60000 518 1056 48000
F-35C 65.22 13.41 60000 679 1056 48000
F-22 170.27 172.53 60000 1024 1122 50000
F/A-18 E 89.54 30.1 66000 1001.18 1188 50000
F/A-18 F 89.67 30.1 66000 1001.18 1188 50000
F/A-18 A-D 53.06 7.35 56000 391.26 1188 50000
F-15E 62.91 9.84 81000 788.28 1650 60000
F-15 A-D 51.2 11.85 68000 1220.98 1650 65000
F-16C 31.80 6.044 48000 970.49 1320 50000
F-16D 31.81 6.044 48000 970.49 1320 50000
F-14D 121.47 50.87 74349 1239 1240.8 53000
F-14 A-C 58.3 9.71 74349 1239 1240.8 53000
AV-8B 41.1 11.41 30990 503 646.8 50000
F-117A 86.69 46.48 52000 795 594 33000
F-5F 15.29 22.24 24018 656 996.6 52500
F-5E 8.14 3.18 24018 656 996.6 52500
F-4E 12.41 0.13 41135 422.05 1478.4 57200
F-4D 11.13 1.37 38706 455.4 1425.6 54950
F-4C 11.61 0.71 38606 484.15 1425.6 55400
F-111F 49 12.84 85161 920 1584 58500
F-111D 40.44 20.46 85406 920 1584 55150
F-111E 48.85 15.14 84433 920 1584 53300
F-111A 46.69 20.5 82632 920 1452 57900
F-106B 31.3 0.38 36500 727.95 1265 51400
F-106A 30.83 4.33 38700 727.95 1265 52000
F-105B 37.06 1.72 52500 230 1372.8 49000
F-105D 13.35 1.76 52500 230 1372.8 49000
F-105F 13.44 4.29 54300 230 1346.4 49000
F-104A 11.55 N/A 24804 402.5 1320 55200
F-104B 15.74 N/A 24294 216.2 1320 48600
F-104C 9.84 2.54 27853 351.9 1320 58000
F-104D 9.58 2.46 23725 180.55 1320 53000
F-102A 8.28 1.73 31276 650.9 778.55 51400
F-101A 19.75 N/A 48000 793.5 1000.5 50300
F-101C 8.37 N/A 49000 603.75 1000.5 50300
F-101B 11.2 0.42 45461 693.45 1092.5 50700
F-100A 7 0.79 32500 586.5 816.5 49000
F-100C 4.56 1.54 37000 575 923.45 49000
F-100D 4.81 0.76 39750 529 908.5 47700
F-100F 5.28 0.69 40100 517.5 908.5 47300
F-94A 2 N/A 15710 1077.55 604.9 46000
F-94B 1.51 N/A 16000 1077.55 587.65 48000
F-94C 3.72 N/A 24200 1200 639.4 51400
F-89D 5.53 N/A 45575 500.25 517.5 43500
F-86F 1.5 N/A 20650 287.5 690 45000
F-86H 4.02 N/A 21800 419.75 747.5 47200
F-86D 2.39 N/A 19952 269.1 691.955 49600
F-84E 1.63 N/A 18000 849.85 599.15 45000
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 Data from 50 aircraft from 1949-present were used to construct two models – one based on procurement costs 
and one based on research, design, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs.  The models, based on a linear Box-Cox 
transformation, demonstrated that the unique F-22 trait, the ability to super-cruise, has the highest per-unit implicit 
price ($68.5M), followed by the stealth technology ($58.7M) and large-scale integrated circuitry ($55.3M).  The high 
marginal value for the super-cruise trait implies that, depending on how super-cruise is used operationally, the F-35A 
may be a more effective purchase in terms of resource allocation than the F-22A. 
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